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In an initial public oﬀering of shares (IPO) the issuer sells securities for which there does
not yet exist a secondary market price. The issuer must thus not only market and distribute
the shares, but also determine a price at which the securities can be sold. Various types of
mechanisms have been used to do this. In auctions, investors submit bids, and then securi-
ties are priced and allocated according to explicit rules. In bookbuilt oﬀerings, underwriters
collect investors’ indications of interest, and then exercise discretion in the pricing and al-
location of the securities. Apart from this diﬀerence, both mechanisms have in common
that pricing-relevant information is obtained directly from potential buyers in the primary
market.
Alternatively, information that is needed for setting primary market prices may be re-
vealed through trading in related securities. For some securities, there may even be active
forward trading before the securities are oﬀered in the primary market. This is the case
for auctions of U.S. Treasury securities, in which investors buy and sell the securities in a
pre-auction, “when-issued” market. This when-issued market can allow the release of infor-
mation that may aﬀect investors’ bidding strategies in the auction and thus the price(s) at
which the securities are sold. In the U.S., IPOs diﬀer from Treasury issues in that there
is no market for when-issued trading of IPO shares. Such trading is eﬀectively prohibited
byaU.S. securities regulation that restricts the covering of short sales.1 The stated reason
for the short sale restriction is: “Such short sales could result in a lower oﬀering price and
reduce an issuer’s proceeds.”2
In contrast to the U.S., a number of countries in Europe do permit when-issued trading
before the IPO. Germany, in particular, stands out as a country with a very active when-
issued market for IPO shares. The prices in this market are publicly available and so may
act as indications of how an IPO should be priced at the oﬀer. In fact, to quote one of
the largest market makers in the German when-issued market: “By observing when-issued
1Regulation M, Rule 105 prohibits the covering of short positions in IPO shares that were created within the last ﬁve days
before pricing, with allocations received in the IPO. In addition to this rule, there are also restrictions on trading in unregistered
shares.
2See Paragraph II.F. of the Securities Exchange Act Release No. 38067(December 20, 1996) on Regulation M, found at the
webaddress, http://www.sec.gov/rules/ﬁnal/34-38067.txt. Regulation M became eﬀective on March 4, 1997.
1trading, the underwriter can gauge the market’s interest in an IPO.”3
The German when-issued market operates concurrently with a bookbuilding process in
which underwriters collect indications of interest directly from investors. Bookbuilding has
been recognized as a source of information for IPO pricing. The theory of Benveniste and
Spindt (1989) explains how underwriters can elicit information directly from investors. Han-
ley (1993) provides evidence consistent with this theory. It is possible, however, that in the
presence of when-issued trading, bookbuilding does not play this informational role. Accord-
ing to Benveniste and Spindt, gathering information through bookbuilding may be costly.
Prices of when-issued trading, on the other hand, are publicly and freely available. For this
reason, it may be that underwriters in a market with when-issued trading will not gather
information through bookbuilding. They may instead use bookbuilding only as a means for
distributing shares.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether when-issued trading does provide
information that is useful for IPO pricing, and whether when-issued trading supplants book-
building as a source of such information. To answer these questions, we study IPO pricing
in the German market. We ﬁnd that when-issued trading does reveal information that is
relevant for IPO pricing. We also ﬁnd that, once when-issued trading begins, bookbuilding
is not a source of costly information for underwriters. Despite these results, however, we
cannot conclude that bookbuilding is fully supplanted by when-issued trading as a source of
information for IPO pricing. We instead ﬁnd evidence consistent with bookbuilding being
used to gather information prior to the onset of when-issued trading.
When-issued trading commences soon after the underwriter posts a preliminary range for
the price at which IPO shares will be oﬀered in the primary market. This trading continues
up to the ﬁrst day of secondary market trading of the shares. In our empirical analysis, we
distinguish between bookbuilding before and after the opening of the when-issued market,
that is before and after the range has been set. In order to determine the role of bookbuilding
after range setting, we test for a “partial adjustment phenomenon”, as documented by Hanley
3This quote was taken from the website of Schnigge AG, http://www.schnigge.de/info/service/pre-ipo-trading.html. The
orginal quote was in German: “Der Emissionsf¨ uhrer kann auf Grund der Handelst¨ atigkeit im Handel per Erscheinen das Interesse
des Marktes an der Neuemission messen.”
2(1993) for U.S. IPOs. Hanley found that there is a signiﬁcant positive relation between IPO
initial returns and the revision of IPO oﬀer prices from price ranges set some time before IPO
pricing. This ﬁnding is consistent with the theory of bookbuilding that has been posited by
Benveniste and Spindt (1989). According to this theory investors are loath to reveal positive
information about an issue because this will increase the price they must pay for shares.
To encourage investors to truthfully reveal positive information, underwriters only partially
adjust the IPO oﬀer price with respect to such information, and then allocate underpriced
shares to those investors who provided the information. The investors thus receive rents in
exchange for their information. The partial adjustment phenomenon found by Hanley (1993)
has been documented in the U.S. also by other researchers and with more recent data.4
We do not ﬁnd a partial adjustment phenomenon in the German IPO market. We thus
ﬁnd no evidence, of the sort found in the U.S., that investors are rewarded for providing
information in bookbuilding after price ranges have been posted. This ﬁnding suggests that
underwriters either do not gather information after when-issued trading begins, or they
obtain the information for free through the prices of when-issued trading.
The lack of a partial adjustment phenomenon, together with our ﬁnding that when-issued
trading reveals pricing-relevant information, may imply that when-issued trading supplants
bookbuilding as a source of such information. Before concluding this, however, we test one
more hypothesis: if underwriters can indeed obtain all relevant information for free, then
investors should not receive rents for any information, including information impounded in
the prices of when-issued trading. However, we reject this hypothesis: we ﬁnd that, in pricing
IPOs, underwriters systematically underreact to information contained in the prices of recent
trades in the when-issued market. Hence, investors in the primary market realize returns that
could be informational rents. According to the theory described above, the investors should
only receive such rents for providing underwriters with positive private information. Prices
in the when-issued market are publicly available. Hence, our ﬁndings raise the question of
why informational rents may be paid for information that is available for free.
We suggest a simple answer to this question: prior to the onset of when-issued trading,
the underwriter collects information directly from investors in order to set the price range.
4See, for example, Bradley and Jordan (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2001).
3The setting of this range is important, in that underwriters in this market do not set the
oﬀer price above the range.5 In order to obtain information prior to when-issued trading,
the underwriter may underprice the IPO to reward investors for providing the information.
If some of this information gets impounded into the prices of when-issued trading, IPOs will
be underpriced relative to these prices.6
To summarize, we provide evidence of the coexistence of two rather diﬀerent sources
of information for determining the oﬀer prices for IPOs in Germany. Underwriters gather
information from potential investors before posting a price range. When-issued trading com-
mences after the range has been posted. This trading indicates to the underwriter where
the IPO should be priced, within or below the price range. There is no partial adjust-
ment phenomenon, indicating that investors are not rewarded for providing information
after when-issued trading commences. However, investors may be rewarded for providing
information to underwriters prior to the onset of when-issued trading.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with other recent contributions to the literature. Jenkinson
and Jones (2002) examine data from order books of European IPOs. By looking at books
built after the posting of price ranges, they ﬁnd that while institutional bidders are favored
in the allocation of IPO shares, this favorable treatment is not necessarily a reward for
information contained in their orders. Jenkinson, Morrison, and Wilhelm (2003) argue that
underwriters’ commitments to binding price ranges may assist in information gathering,
through bookbuilding prior to setting the ranges. They also discuss institutional details
that are consistent with our evidence of information gathering prior to the range setting.
Pichler and Stomper (2003) develop a model that shows how information gathering through
bookbuilding can enable informative when-issued trading. They also argue that, due to the
interdependence of bookbuilding and when-issued trading, the presence of an active when-
issued market should not interfere with the process of gathering information directly from
5In the U.S. underwriters can price 20% above the range and often amend ranges so as to price even higher. This does not
happen in Europe. Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) in their investigation of French, German and UK IPOs pointed
out that IPOs in these countries are almost never priced above the posted ranges. None of the IPOs in our study are priced
above the posted range.
6It has been documented for U.S. IPOs that initial returns are positively related to publicly available information. See Lowry
and Schwert (2002), Loughran and Ritter (2002a) and Bradley and Jordan (2002). We provide an explanation why this may
occur with respect to when-issued prices.
4investors.
Our paper extends the existing literature on IPO pricing, and underpricing, by investi-
gating information gathering in a market with a diﬀerent institutional framework than that
in the United States. Other recent papers have examined the connection between share
allocations and pricing in European IPO markets. Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) examine
bookbuilding by one European investment bank and ﬁnd that investors who post more infor-
mative bids do on average earn higher proﬁts since they receive more favorable allocations of
IPO shares. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) address the link between information gathering
and allocations to institutional investors, using data from France, Germany, the United King-
dom and the United States. They ﬁnd a linkage between these allocations, price revisions
and underpricing that is consistent with the theory of Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
This paper is also related to the literature on when-issued markets. Bikchandani and
Huang (1993) describe the when-issued market for U.S. Treasury securities, and discuss the
concern that traders who plan to bid in Treasury auctions will be loath to reveal positive in-
formation in when-issued trading. Bikchandani and Huang (1992) and Nyborg and Sundare-
san (1996) provide evidence consistent with this concern, although Nyborg and Sundaresan
show that this is less of a concern for uniform price auctions, as compared to discriminatory
price auctions. L¨ oﬄer, Panther and Theissen (2002) examine the when-issued market for
German IPOs and ﬁnd that the ﬁnal prices in this market are unbiased predictors of opening
prices in the secondary market. Our study diﬀers from theirs in that we focus on the pricing
of IPOs, and on the interaction of bookbuilding and when-issued trading.7
The paper is organized as follows. The following section provides a description of key
institutional aspects of the German IPO market. In the third section we describe our data.
In the fourth section we provide, through the use of summary statistics, an overview of
IPO pricing relative to price ranges and when-issued trading prices. In the ﬁfth section
we develop a number of hypotheses on IPO pricing in the presence of bookbuilding and
when-issued trading. It is in this section that we also present a methodology to test for a
7There is also when-issued trading of shares prior to stock splits and spinoﬀs. This when-issued trading occurs in parallel
with secondary market trading of similar, and possibly even identical securities. See, for example, Ezzel, Miles and Mulherin
(2002).
5partial adjustment phenomenon (as deﬁned by Hanley (1993)), in the presence of binding
price ranges. In the sixth section we present the regression model and discuss the regression
results. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Institutional Characteristics of the German IPO Market
In March 1997 the Frankfurt Stock Exchange created the Neuer Markt (New Market) in
order to facilitate the ﬁnancing of young companies.8 In 1999 more companies went public
on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange than on any other European exchange. (See Table 1.)
Worldwide, only Nasdaq saw more IPO activity. In September 2002, the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange announced the closure of the Neuer Markt as part of a reorganization of the
exchange’s market segments. This reorganization has no direct consequences for the topic of
our study, IPO pricing with bookbuilding and when-issued trading. The generic institutional
framework that we study here continues to exist in Germany and other European countries.
The Neuer Markt is similar to U.S. equity markets in its disclosure requirements for
listing ﬁrms and is similar to Nasdaq in the types of ﬁrms that go public and list there.9
As in the U.S., most companies are taken public using bookbuilding methods. However,
the bookbuilding process on the Neuer Markt may diﬀer from that in the U.S. due to the
existence of an active market for when-issued trading of IPO shares. This market is referred
to as the “grey market”. As we expect that many readers are familiar with the Nasdaq
IPO market we will describe the Neuer Markt largely by contrasting it with Nasdaq. In
doing so, we do not want to suggest that the Neuer Markt is unique. It is rather the prime
example for an institutional framework that is shared by other European markets. Among
these markets, the Neuer Markt stands out as the most active IPO market with liquid and
complete when-issued trading of IPO shares.10
8The Frankfurt Stock Exchange is part of a larger organization, the Deutsche B¨ orse, or German Stock Exchange. We use
the name Frankfurt Stock Exchange because we expect that this is a more familiar term for readers.
9Kukies (2000) states that ﬁrms that go public on the Neuer Markt are “small, young and belong to industries in which
future growth opportunities rather than ﬁxed assets determine market valuation”.
10In terms of IPO activity, the Neuer Markt is comparable in Europe only to the London Stock Exchange. However, few of
the IPOs in the U.K. feature when-issued trading. According to information from Tullett & Tokyo Liberty (securities) Ltd.,
one of the biggest brokers in the when-issued market of IPOs in Europe, when-issued trading takes place in only 8% of the U.K.
IPOs. We are grateful to Gary Beechener from Tullett & Tokyo Liberty (securities) Ltd. for providing this information.
6Listing and disclosure requirements: Table 2 states criteria for issuers seeking a listing on
the Neuer Markt and on Nasdaq. While these criteria suggest that Neuer Markt IPOs may
be smaller than Nasdaq IPOs, there are few other diﬀerences. Firms listing on the Neuer
Markt must satisfy stricter disclosure requirements than ﬁrms listing on the main market
segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange.11
IPO pricing through bookbuilding: Bookbuilding is the dominant method for selling IPO
shares on the Neuer Markt. As is done in the U.S., underwriters post price ranges some
time before the ﬁnal pricing of issues. However, there are a number of diﬀerences: 1) For
Neuer Markt IPOs, there is much less variation than in the U.S. in when price ranges are
posted. The initial range for a Neuer Markt IPO is typically posted one week prior to
pricing.12 While bookbuilding “oﬃcially” occurs only after the ﬁling of the ranges, during
the so-called “subscription period”, underwriters may conduct discussions with prospective
investors before setting the price ranges. Thus, the kind of information gathering that
happens through U.S.-style bookbuilding may already begin prior to the ﬁling of the price
ranges.13 2) Underwriters on the Neuer Markt almost never amend posted ranges, whereas
in the U.S. range amendments are quite common. 3) While U.S. issues are frequently priced
outside the ﬁnal price ranges, this is rare for Neuer Markt IPOs. We ﬁnd that during 1999
and 2000, some Neuer Markt issues were priced below the range, but none were priced above.
While no explicit legal restriction keeps underwriters from pricing IPOs above the ranges,
bankers told us that this is never done due to concerns of legal action. Thus, an eﬀective
ceiling is placed on the IPO oﬀer price.
When-issued trading: Virtually all ﬁrms that went public on the Neuer Markt during 1999
and 2000 had an active when-issued, forward market for IPO shares, also known as “Handel
11In fact, the Neuer Markt even requires issuers to draw up ﬁnancial statements according to US-Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (GAAP) or International Accounting Standards (IAS).
12For the years 1999 and 2000, the mean (median) time between the posting of the range and the pricing date is 7.02 (7.00)
calendar days; the minimum (maximum) is 2 (18) calendar days. Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper (2002) examine a sample
of Nasdaq IPOs for the same time period. They ﬁnd that the time of ﬁrst posting a price range varies from 140 days before
pricing to 11 days before.
13Jenkinson, Morrison, and Wilhelm (2003) argue that this constitutes a diﬀerence between IPO pricing in Europe and the
U.S. In the U.S., the 1933 Securities Act discourages underwriters from contacting investors prior to the ﬁling of a registration
statement.
7per Erscheinen” but more commonly called the “grey market”.14 Grey market trading starts
after the ﬁling of the price range, but before the setting of the IPO oﬀer price. The last grey
market trading day is the day before the ﬁrst secondary market trading day. Grey market
trading is oﬀ-exchange over-the-counter trading. Several banks and brokers act as market
makers, but they do not make the market in IPOs for which they act as underwriters. Bid
and ask quotes are published in newspapers, the internet and by large information vendors,
such as Reuters or Bloomberg. All grey market transactions are contingent on whether an
IPO takes place and are settled on the IPO’s ﬁrst trading day. Selling IPO shares in this
market is (by deﬁnition) short-selling, and is restricted to institutions and large investors.15
In spite of this restriction, grey market trading seems to be fairly liquid: while not much data
is available, a major market maker (Schnigge AG) reports to have handled a trading volume
ranging from 5 to 35 million Euros per month in trading shares of IPOs between June 2000
and March 2001. Furthermore, L¨ oﬄer, Panther and Theissen (2002) report that the average
grey market trading volume is comparable to secondary market trading volume.16
Timeline: The timeline, presented in Figure 1, has three stages. In Stage 1, underwriters
can gather information to use in setting the price ranges prior to the opening of when-issued
trading at time tW. After time tW there follows Stage 2, the period of when-issued trading
in the grey market. Grey market trading starts after price ranges are posted, and continues
beyond time tP, which is when the underwriter sets the IPO oﬀer price. The grey market
closes on the evening before the ﬁrst day of trading in the secondary market. The opening
of the secondary market at time t0 marks the beginning of Stage 3. The closing price of the
ﬁrst day of secondary market trading is realized at time tC.
On the Neuer Markt the term bookbuilding is used to refer speciﬁcally to the process of
underwriters collecting investors’ orders during the subscription period. By this deﬁnition,
14The exceptions were six ﬁrms that went public simultaneously on other exchanges. In the analysis that follows we exclude
these ﬁrms.
15See the website of Schnigge, http://www.schnigge.de/index.html. Similarly to the U.S., insiders who owned shares prior to
the IPO are restricted in their ability to sell these shares.
16Forasample of 86 Neuer Markt IPOs L¨ oﬄer, Panther and Theissen (2002) report an average daily grey market trading
volume of 0.48% of the issue volume. This equals roughly the average secondary market trading volume on the 30th trading
day.
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Figure 1: The Neuer Markt IPO Pricing Process
bookbuilding does not start until after time tW.17 Throughout this article, we will use the
term bookbuilding more as a generic term for how underwriters gather information directly
from investors, even if this information gathering happens before time tW.H owever, in our
analysis we will diﬀerentiate between bookbuilding that occurs prior to the opening of the
grey market, and bookbuilding that occurs concurrently with grey market trading.
3 Data
We have collected data for all IPOs that began trading on the Neuer Markt between January
1999 and December 2000. These are the two years in which the Neuer Markt IPO market
was most active. As shown in Table 1, 131 ﬁrms went public on the Neuer Markt in the year
1999 and 132 ﬁrms in 2000. In 2001 only 11 IPOs took place on the Neuer Markt. The years
1999 and 2000 are unquestionably regarded as a hot market period for IPOs. Ljungqvist and
Wilhelm (2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2002b) ﬁnd that even after controlling for many
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, such as ﬁrm age and whether the ﬁrm is in a high-technology
industry, initial returns are signiﬁcantly positively related to whether a ﬁrm went public
during the 1999-2000 period. While some of our quantitative results may be aﬀected by this,
we do not expect that it aﬀects our qualitative results regarding the roles of bookbuilding
and grey market trading in IPO pricing.
17The subscription period starts usually on the day after time tW and continues typically for four days.
9Exclusions: Six IPOs were dual listings that went public simultaneously on the Neuer Markt
and another exchange. We exclude these observations from our sample, because the pricing
may involve information gathering in markets for which we have no data. In addition, we
use the data for IPOs in January 1999 solely to measure primary market conditions prior to
the IPOs in February. We exclude the four IPOs in January 1999 from our regression sample
because we do not have data for primary market conditions prior to these IPOs. With the
exclusion of these ten IPOs, we obtain a ﬁnal sample of 253 IPOs.
Data sources: Data was obtained from Deutsche B¨ orse AG (primary market data), Reuters,
Thomson Financial – Datastream, and Karlsruher Kapitalmarktdatenbank (secondary mar-
ket data), as well as from one of the two most important market makers in the grey market,
the German Schnigge AG (prices of grey market trading). In the regressions involving data
on when-issued trading, we use the price of the last transaction before the pricing date tP of
each IPO. To obtain these data, we asked Schnigge AG to search their archive of transaction
records. For 14 IPOs we could not obtain such price data. For these IPOs, we use the last
mid-quotes (mean of the bid and ask quotes) posted before the pricing date. As discussed
in Section 2, when-issued trading usually continues for at least one day after the setting of
the IPO oﬀer price. Thus, the closing prices on the ﬁnal day of when-issued trading may
contain information that was not available when the IPO oﬀer price was set. For this reason
we do not use the ﬁnal grey market closing prices in our analysis.
To our knowledge, our data set is the only one that includes prices of grey market trans-
actions just before IPO pricing for such a large sample of IPOs. Unfortunately, we lack
corresponding volume data, as would be needed in order to detect price eﬀects of large
transactions. However, we can check whether there is a systematic diﬀerence between the
grey market prices and the prices at which trading opens in the secondary market. To this
end, we regressed these opening prices on the grey market prices. We found that the latter
prices are unbiased predictors of the former prices.18
For the industry classiﬁcation of Neuer Markt IPOs we draw on the industry description
in the prospectus and on the NEMAX (Neuer-Markt-Index) industry classiﬁcations. We
18The results of this regression are not reported here, but may be obtained from the authors.
10split our sample into groups of IPOs by high-technology and nonhigh-technology issuers, as
well as internet and noninternet issuers. These industry groups overlap, in that each IPO
is assigned to two groups. For example, IPOs of internet retailers are classiﬁed both as
nonhigh-technology and as internet. To identify high-technology issuers, we use the high-
technology industry description in Appendix 4 of Loughran and Ritter (2002b). (High-
technology issuers are in the businesses of computer hardware, communications equipment,
electronics, navigation equipment, measuring and controlling devices, medical instruments,
telephone equipment, communications services, and software). IPOs are classiﬁed as internet
IPOs if the NEMAX industry classiﬁcation is “internet”.
Descriptive statistics on the size of issues and issuers: Summary statistics on the size of
IPO issues and issuers are presented in Table 3. For comparison, we include data on the
Nasdaq IPO market for the same time period.19 In the years 1999 and 2000, the Neuer
Markt IPO market was more dominated by high-technology issuers than was the Nasdaq
IPO market, but the Neuer Markt IPO market saw signiﬁcantly less activity by internet
ﬁrms. High-technology issuers account for 68% of IPO volume on the Neuer Markt and 51%
on Nasdaq; internet issuers account for 34.5% of the volume on the Neuer Markt and 49%
on Nasdaq. In absolute numbers of IPOs, 72% (61%) of Neuer Markt (Nasdaq) IPO ﬁrms
were high-technology ﬁrms. Only 21% of Neuer Markt IPO ﬁrms were internet ﬁrms, as
compared to 50% on Nasdaq.
The market capitalization of the issuers as well as the IPO proceeds are smaller on the
Neuer Markt than on Nasdaq; this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 5% level and is somewhat
more pronounced for high-technology and noninternet IPOs.20 In terms of the fraction of
issuers’ stock sold at the IPO, ﬁrms listing on the Neuer Markt on average sell a signiﬁcantly
larger fraction than those on Nasdaq. This is true across all four industry classiﬁcations.
The markets are similar in that, in both markets, internet ﬁrms sell a smaller fraction of
19Numbers for the Nasdaq IPO market are based on data obtained directly from the U.S. SEC Edgar database. Unit oﬀerings,
REITs (real estate investment trusts), closed-end funds, banks and savings and loans, ADRs (American Depository Receipts)
and preferred stock oﬀerings are excluded. Nasdaq high-technology issuers were identiﬁed using the SIC codes as described in
Appendix 4 of Loughran and Ritter (2002b). To identify internet IPOs we use the list of internet IPOs provided by Jay Ritter,
http://bear.cba.uﬂ.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.
20For Nasdaq IPOs the currency of denomination is US$; for Neuer Markt IPOs it is the Euro. The average value of one
Euro during the years 1999 and 2000 was close to one, at US$1.012.
11their equity than do noninternet ﬁrms.
4 IPO Pricing Relative to Ranges and Grey Market Trading
In this section we discuss observed patterns in the pricing of IPOs relative to price ranges
and grey market prices. Price ranges for Neuer Markt IPOs exhibit more variation than
for IPOs on Nasdaq. For our sample of Neuer Markt IPOs, the mean value of the range
center (midpoint between the range minimum and maximum) is Euro 22.10 and the standard
deviation is Euro 11.60. Most Nasdaq IPOs during 1999 and 2000 had initial price ranges of
$10 to $12.21
Table 4 presents data on the distribution of IPO oﬀer prices and grey market prices relative
to the price ranges. No IPO in our sample is priced above the range maximum.22 More than
half of the IPOs are priced exactly at the range maximum. Thus, the range appears to be
eﬀectively binding at the upper end. IPOs are priced below the range minimum. The ranges
do seem to deﬁne some focal points for IPO pricing. About 10% of the IPOs are priced
precisely at the lower end of the range, and a quarter of the IPOs priced within the range
have an oﬀer price equal to the range center.
Panel B of Table 4 presents data on IPO oﬀer prices, relative to both the range and the
prices paid for IPO shares in the grey market. More than 90% of the IPOs with a grey
market price above the price range are priced, at the IPO, exactly at the range maximum.
The majority of IPOs with grey market prices within the range also have IPO oﬀer prices
within the range. Of those IPOs with grey market prices below the range, half have IPO
oﬀer prices that are also below the range. Thus, it appears that the grey market provides
an indication of how an IPO should be priced relative to the range, with the constraint that
the IPO will not be priced above the range.
In Table 5 we examine IPO pricing further. Panel A of Table 5 presents statistics on
the percentage by which underwriters deviate in IPO pricing from the grey market price.
21U.S. ﬁrms often undergo stock splits prior to going public, so as to manage the stock price.
22This observation is consistent with earlier observations in European IPO markets. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) in their
investigation of French, German and UK IPOs pointed out that IPOs in these countries are almost never priced above the
posted price ranges. Derrien and Womack (2003) also point this out for French IPOs. In contrast, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm
(2003) document for the year 1999 (2000) that 47% (39%) of U.S. IPOs were priced above the range.
12“Constrained” IPOs in this table are those that had a grey market price above the range and
an oﬀer price exactly at the top of the range. On average, IPO oﬀer prices are about 22%
below the grey market price. This is perhaps not very surprising, given the underwriters’
policy of not pricing above posted price ranges. However, we ﬁnd that underwriters on
average price below the grey market prices, even if the price ranges do not constrain their
pricing decisions. Across the 79 IPOs with unconstrained oﬀer prices, the oﬀer prices are on
average 4.5% below the grey market prices. A t-test reveals that this deviation is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = −4.1006).
Panel B of Table 5 provides statistics on the initial returns of our sample of IPOs, deﬁned
as the percentage return between the oﬀer price and the ﬁrst day closing price. Across all
IPOs in our sample, the mean initial return is 46.7%; the median is 19.6%. In comparison,
Loughran and Ritter (2002b) report for the years 1999 and 2000 a mean (median) initial
return of 65.0% (32.3%) for IPOs in the U.S.23 For the subset of IPOs with constrained
oﬀer prices the average initial return is 67.1%. For IPOs with unconstrained oﬀer prices, the
average initial return is only 1.7%; not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
5 The Model and Hypotheses
5.1 Economic arguments
We start by outlining the economic arguments behind the model. There are a number of
diﬀerences between obtaining information through bookbuilding and obtaining information
from trading. These diﬀerences may cause one or the other source of information to be more
eﬀective. The key characteristic of bookbuilding is that underwriters gather information
directly from investors. As described in the Introduction, doing so may require the issuer
to pay rents for the information. In addition to the cost of paying investors informational
rents, bookbuilding also requires underwriters to incur the cost of building and maintaining
relationships with investors. Due to this cost, the number of relationships is limited, and
underwriters may miss important pieces of information that reside with investors who do
23If we include the 10 excluded IPOs, then in the sample of 263 IPOs the mean (median) initial returns are slightly higher,
i.e. 48.2% (20.0%).
13not participate in bookbuilding. But, if such investors trade in the grey market, then their
information can be revealed through the prices in this market. The grey market therefore
represents a potentially important source of free information for IPO pricing. This does not
necessarily imply, however, that the grey market can supplant bookbuilding as an indicator
of how IPOs should be priced.
Fore ﬀective information aggregation, the grey market must be suﬃciently liquid so that
informed traders are willing and able to participate. The market microstructure literature
and the literature on when-issued trading of U.S. Treasury securities suggest reasons why
such liquidity cannot be taken for granted. First, prospective sellers may stay out of the
market because of the possibility of a “squeeze”. In Treasury markets, a squeeze can occur
if short-sellers in the when-issued market are not awarded securities in the auction.24 If
bookbuilding precedes grey market trading, however, then some investors may already be
conﬁdent that they will be allocated IPO shares, thus lessening the fear of squeezes.25 Second,
prospective buyers may be loath to trade too aggressively prior to IPO pricing, because such
trading may lead to a higher oﬀer price. Bikhchandani and Huang (1992) and Nyborg and
Sundaresan (1996) provide evidence consistent with this for when-issued trading prior to U.S.
Treasury auctions. As discussed, however, grey market trading of IPO shares commences
only after the posting of a price range which places an eﬀective ceiling on the oﬀer price.
Finally, as modeled by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), a market may fail to open if there
are severe informational asymmetries across potential traders. In the presence of such asym-
metries, agents who would normally supply liquidity (market makers) quote spreads that are
so wide that no trading occurs. Relative to the valuation of Treasury bonds, the valuation
of IPO shares is apt to involve more “private” information that is held only by a subset of
potential investors.26 Thus, this problem is potentially much more severe in when-issued
24See Bikhchandani and Huang (1993), Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996), and Chatterjea and Jarrow (1998).
25The following quote is from the website of Schnigge AG, one of the larger market makers in the grey market: “Sellers in
the when-issued market are also foreign banks who can count on receiving a certain number of shares in the primary market.”
The orginal quote was in German: “Auch haben ausl¨ andische Banken Festzusagen ¨ uber eine gewisse Aktienanzahl, die sie gerne
schon vorb¨ orslich mit entsprechender Marge verkaufen.” This quote was taken from: http://www.schnigge.de/info/service/pre-
ipo-trading.html.
26For example, Treasury securities can typically be priced relative to similar securities that are already trading. While there
may be asymmetries of information about demand in a Treasury auction, there are unlikely to be signiﬁcant asymmetries of
information about other fundamentals.
14trading of IPO shares, as compared to when-issued trading of Treasury securities. The post-
ing of price ranges at time tW,h owever, may mitigate this problem. Price ranges are not
merely “cheap talk” because the underwriters do not set oﬀer prices above the ranges. As
such, the ranges can reveal some information that the underwriter has gathered directly
from informed investors.27 The revelation of such information can mitigate informational
asymmetries between traders in the when-issued market, and hence enable this market to
open.
To summarize, we argue that when-issued trading in the grey market may not supplant
bookbuilding as a source of information for IPO pricing. Instead, eﬀective information ag-
gregation in grey market prices may even depend upon the gathering of information through
bookbuilding and the (partial) release of this information, prior to the opening of grey mar-
ket trading. Hence, grey market trading may not be able to supplant bookbuilding, even if
grey market prices subsequently reveal all information that can be obtained before setting
the IPO oﬀer price. This is not, of course, to suggest that underwriters deliberately promote
when-issued trading of IPO shares. Rather, it may simply be the case that bookbuilding
generates externalities that enable the opening of informative when-issued trading.
5.2 Hypotheses: IPO pricing relative to grey market prices
In developing our hypotheses, we ﬁrst address the question of whether grey market trading
reveals information of relevance for setting the IPO oﬀer price. Such information would
aﬀect how the underwriter revises the IPO oﬀer price relative to the price range that is set
just before grey market trading commences. We deﬁne the price revision as the diﬀerence
between the IPO oﬀer price and the center of the price range. We use the symbol PREV∗
to represent the “latent” price revision, which is the revision that would occur if the oﬀer
price were not constrained by the upper end of the price range. We deﬁne the “grey market
return” as the diﬀerence between the price of the last transaction in the grey market before
IPO pricing at time tP, and the center of the price range. We thus deﬁne PREV∗ and grey
27Consistent with this view, Jenkinson, Morrision and Wilhelm (2003) argue that underwriters set the price ranges after they
obtain some information from investors. Pichler and Stomper (2003) demonstrate how engaging in direct information gathering,
prior to when-issued trading, can enable informative when-issued trading, as a positive externality of bookbuilding.
15market return in similar ways. As such, any relation between these variables is due to a
relation between the IPO oﬀer prices and the prices in the grey market, not returns.28
If grey market trading reveals information that is of relevance for setting the oﬀer price,
then we should be able to reject the following hypothesis:
HInf
GREY: After controlling for other public information, the grey market return has
ac o eﬃcient of zero in a regression explaining the latent price revision, PREV∗.
The alternative hypothesis is that the coeﬃcient is greater than zero. If we reject HInf
GREY
in favor of the alternative, then there is evidence that the grey market reveals information
of relevance for setting the oﬀer price.
We next test whether underwriters fully revise the oﬀer prices of IPOs relative to infor-
mation contained in the grey market prices:
H
Adj
GREY: In a regression explaining the latent price revision PREV∗, the grey
market return has a coeﬃcient of one.
The alternative to hypothesis H
Adj
GREY is that the coeﬃcient is less than one. That is, under-
writers revise the pricing of IPO shares only partially with respect to the grey market prices.
If IPO oﬀer prices are “under-revised” relative to information revealed by the grey market,
then investors who receive share allocations at the oﬀer price earn a return that is related
to positive information impounded in grey market prices. As discussed in the Introduction,
if we reject H
Adj
GREY in favor of the alternative, then it would appear as if rents are paid
for information that is made publicly available through grey market trading.29 However,
a natural explanation for this is simply that grey market trading reveals some information
that underwriters gather prior to the onset of grey market trading in order to set the price
ranges. If such information is obtained directly from investors through bookbuilding, then
according to the theories described, we would expect to observe an “under-revision” in the
pricing of IPOs, with respect to this information.30
28We deﬁne our variables as returns in this section so that we can use the same variables in the empirical tests in the following
section.
29We want to emphasize that hypothesis H
Adj
GREY regards the latent price revision; if we reject this hypothesis, it is not due
to the pricing constraint.
30We use the term “under-revision” in order to distinguish this phenomenon from the ”partial adjustment” phenomenon
described in the Introduction and modeled in the following section.
165.3 Price revisions with a pricing constraint
Before writing our next set of hypotheses, we must develop a model of IPO pricing and un-
derpricing that explicitly allows for a pricing constraint. As discussed above, IPO pricing in
this market is constrained by the upper ends of the posted ranges, but there is no compelling
evidence of a constraint at the lower end. Thus, the price revision from the midpoint of the
price range to the oﬀer price can be expressed as:
PREV = min[PREV
∗,MAXREV ], (1)
where PREV denotes the actual price revision from the midpoint to the oﬀer price (in
Euros), MAXREV is the maximum possible price revision (the diﬀerence between the top
and the midpoint of the price range), and PREV∗ is the latent price revision that would
result if the underwriter were able to set the oﬀer price above the top of the price range.
The latent price revision may be due to both public information, and private information
that the underwriter obtains in the course of bookbuilding after setting the price range.
However, Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) theory of bookbuilding relates only to private
information. We therefore wish to control for any partial adjustment that may be explained
by public information.31 In everything that follows, we will distinguish between the latent
price revision that is due to public information and that due to private information:
PREV
∗ = PREV 0 + β × i, (2)
where PREV 0 is that part of the latent price revision that is induced by publicly available
information, i is information about the value of IPO shares that the underwriter obtains
from investors who participate in bookbuilding, and β is a coeﬃcient that will equal one if
the underwriter fully adjusts the oﬀer price in response to the information i.
We assume that the ﬁrst day closing price reveals the true share value (or, alternatively,
that the information gathered by underwriters is about the ﬁrst day closing price). The
31Lowry and Schwert (2002), Loughran and Ritter (2002a) and Bradley and Jordan (2002) all provide evidence for U.S. IPOs
that initial returns are positively related to publicly available information, such as market returns prior to setting the IPO oﬀer
price.
17(Euro) initial return can be expressed as:




(1 − β) × i if PREV∗ ≤ MAXREV,
(1 − β) × i +( PREV∗ − MAXREV)i f PREV∗ >MA XREV ,
(3)
where IR denotes the Euro-return between the ﬁrst day closing price and the oﬀer price
of an IPO.32 IR0 is the initial return if i =0(that is, if after setting the price range, the
underwriter receives no private information), and if the oﬀer price is not constrained by the
top of the price range (PREV∗ ≤ MAXREV). The term (1 − β) × i represents per share
informational rents that are paid to investors in the form of initial returns.
Next, we derive the relation between the price revision and the initial return. From
equation (2): i =( PREV∗−PREV 0)/β.U pon substituting for i in equation (3), we obtain
the following:
IR = IR0 +

     
     
γU × (PREV∗ − PREV 0)i f PREV∗ ≤ MAXREV,
γC × (PREV∗ − PREV 0)
+ δ × (PREV 0 − MAXREV)i f PREV∗ >MA XREV ,
(4)
where γU =( 1 − β)/β, γC =1 /β, and δ =1 .I ni n terpreting the above equation,
PREV∗ − PREV 0 is that part of the latent price revision which cannot be explained by
public information. For IPOs subject to constrained pricing (PREV∗ >M A X REV ), the
initial returns equation contains an additional term: PREV 0 − MAXREV is the extent to
which the price range constrains the price revision.33 If rents are paid for information, in
the form of partial adjustment, then β<1, so that γU > 0 and γC > 1.
From this point onward we will refer to IPOs subject to constrained pricing as “con-
strained” IPOs (C), and all others as “unconstrained” IPOs (U). In the following section,
consistent with equation (4), we will form diﬀerent hypotheses for IPOs that are constrained
and those that are unconstrained.
32In the empirical analysis, we will translate this Euro-return into a rate of return.
33Note that PREV0 is the latent price revision, given only public information. Thus, PREV0 − MAXREV measures the
extent of the pricing constraint relative only to public information.
185.4 Hypotheses: Bookbuilding during grey market trading
The next hypotheses address the question of whether underwriters conduct bookbuilding to
obtain costly information for IPO pricing after the grey market opens. In answering this
question we will conduct a test of the partial adjustment phenomenon that is similar to
that of Hanley (1993). A key aspect of this test is that we proxy for private information
gathering by measuring the adjustment from the posted price range to the oﬀer price. This
is appropriate for the analysis of information gathering during grey market trading, because
the opening of the grey market immediately follows the posting of the price range. Our
analysis in this section is also similar to Hanley’s in that we use initial returns as a measure
of informational rents paid to investors. Our analysis diﬀers from hers in that we need
to adjust the model, as described in the previous section, to account for constrained IPO
pricing.
If no informational rents are paid to investors who participate in bookbuilding after the
setting of the range, then the underwriters will fully adjust the oﬀer prices of IPOs in response
to any information i that they receive. In this case, β of equation (2) will equal one, γU
of equation (4) will equal zero, and γC will equal one. We thus obtain the following two
hypotheses:
HU
REV: When regressing the initial returns of unconstrained IPOs on that part
of the latent price revision that cannot be explained with public information, the
coeﬃcient (γU)i sequal to zero.
HC
REV: When regressing the initial returns of constrained IPOs on that part of
the latent price revision that cannot be explained with public information, the
coeﬃcient (γC)i sequal to one.
If instead, there is an informational role of bookbuilding after grey market trading starts
(after time tW), then the theory of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggests that β<1. In this
case, we should reject the hypotheses HU
REV and HC
REV in favor of the alternative hypotheses
that γU > 0 and γC > 1.
We should point out that the hypotheses HU
REV and HC
REV are really joint hypotheses.
Whether or not we can reject these hypotheses depends on both (i) whether underwriters
receive information from investors who participate in bookbuilding after time tW, and (ii)
19whether the investors receive informational rents. It is possible that underwriters receive
informative orders from investors after time tW, but no informational rents must be paid to
the investors since the information is simultaneously revealed through grey market trading.34
5.5 Initial Returns and Pricing “Constraints”
Equation (4) also provides predictions as to how initial returns are related to the fact that
underwriters do not price IPOs above the price ranges. For constrained IPOs, this equation
has a second term, PREV 0 − MAXREV, which indicates the extent to which the range
constrains the oﬀer price. Initial returns represent money left on the table by the issuer. The
extent to which the oﬀer price is constrained, PREV 0−MAXREV,t hus represents the per
share amount of money left on the table due to the pricing constraint. We will check whether
this amount is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and will then calculate a cost of constrained
pricing for those IPOs that are priced at the top of the range.35
6 Regression Analysis
Our regression analysis consists of two parts. We ﬁrst examine the setting of the IPO oﬀer
price and test the hypotheses HInf
GREY and H
Adj
GREY.W enext examine the relation between





In the regression analysis we normalize the variables introduced in Section 5 by the range
center. Our dependent variable in this part of the analysis is thus the percentage latent price
revision:
PREV
∗ = 100 ×
oﬀer price* − range center
range center
(5)
34We thank Michel Habib for pointing this out.
35The term PREV0 − MAXREV actually captures only that part of the constraint that is due to public information. That
part of the constratint that is due to private information is included in the ﬁrst term and we are unable to isolate it. Thus, we
actually calculate a lower bound on the amount of money left on the table due to the constraint.
20where oﬀer price* is the oﬀer price that would be set if underwriters did not restrict them-
selves from pricing above the top of the price range.
Our ﬁrst objective is to understand the role that publicly available information plays in
the setting of IPO oﬀer prices in this market. To do so, we estimate the following model:
PREV∗ = f(underwriter reputation, IPO pricing process up to
range setting, issuer characteristics, primary &
secondary market conditions, IPO activity)+ε1
(6)
Panel A of Table 6 presents the exact deﬁnitions of all of the explanatory variables included
in each of the broad categories in equation (6). This model is based on ﬁndings of a number of
previous studies of IPO pricing; the development of the model and the related literature are
discussed in Appendix A. There are three endogenous explanatory variables, written with a
“hat” (ˆ ·)i nP anel A of Table 6. These variables are (i) the proxy for underwriter reputation,
(ii) the center of the price range, and (iii) the fraction of issuer’s stock sold in an IPO. Panel
Bo fT able 6 presents the instruments that we use in the ﬁrst-stage regressions. To obtain an
(over-)identiﬁed model, we impose several exclusion restrictions. The identifying variables
are denoted in bold face in Panel B of Table 6; each of these variables is included in one of
the ﬁrst stage regressions and excluded from the model in any other way.36
In order to test the hypotheses HInf
GREY and H
Adj
GREY,w eexpand the model of equation
(6) to include the grey market return:
PREV∗ = g(underwriter reputation, IPO pricing process up to
range setting, issuer characteristics, primary &
secondary market conditions, IPO activity,
grey market return)+ε2
(7)
where the grey market return is deﬁned as 100(%)×(last grey market price before tP –
RCENTER)÷ RCENTER.
In estimating models (6) and (7), we must take into account the fact that none of the
IPOs are priced above the upper bounds of the price ranges. As a further complication,
36Since the model is overidentiﬁed, we can test the validity of these variables as instruments by testing the exclusion restric-
tions. (There are three endogenous variables and more than three identifying variables. Thus, the model satisﬁes the “order
condition” for identiﬁcation, stated for example in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), page 633.)
21the sizes of these price ranges diﬀer somewhat across IPOs. Thus, the price revision is a
right-censored variable, but censoring occurs at diﬀerent levels of the latent price revision
PREV∗.A n ordinary TOBIT model is not suited to estimate these models. Instead, we
must use a generalized TOBIT model, allowing for the censoring points to vary. We estimate
this model using a routine for “interval regressions” that is available from the Stata Cor-
poration.37 In the estimation, we also allow for heteroscedasticity. Such heteroscedasticity
could arise because IPOs may diﬀer in the extent to which underwriters receive non-public
information of relevance for IPO pricing. We use the issuers’ industry aﬃliations as proxies
for heteroscedasticity.
In order to run the interval regression, we must ﬁrst categorize each IPO as either con-
strained or unconstrained. We use two criteria for identifying constrained IPOs. First, the
oﬀer price of an IPO must equal the upper bound of the price range. Second, a price higher
than this upper bound must have been paid for shares in the last grey market transaction
prior to the pricing date tP. While 177 IPOs satisfy the ﬁrst criterion, three of these fail to
meet the second. We categorize these three IPOs as unconstrained.38
Table 7 presents the results. Panel A reports estimates for the ﬁrst stage regressions.
Panel B presents the results from estimating models (6) and (7). For both models, the test
discussed by Smith and Blundell (1986) rejects exogeneity of the three variables treated as
endogenous, with a p-value of 0.018 for column (1) and a p-value of 0.036 for column (2).39
Furthermore, we test the validity of the set of identifying variables denoted in bold face in
Panel A of Table 7 as instruments. A test of the overidentifying restrictions shows that these
six instruments are indeed neither individually signiﬁcantly related to the price revision, nor
jointly so, with a p-value of 0.84 for column (1) and of 0.25 for column (2). Thus, it is valid
to exclude these variables from the models in Panel B.
The estimates in Table 7 are consistent with ﬁndings of prior studies of IPO pricing.
Column (1) of Panel A reports estimates for the ﬁrst stage regression explaining under-
37This routine, INTREG2, can handle not only interval data but also “point data” (such as the price revision of the uncon-
strained IPOs) and censored data (such as the price revision of the constrained IPOs, where the latent variable PREV∗ is in
the interval [MAXREV,∞)). The estimation method is maximum likelihood, based on a log likelihood function summing up
logs of probabilities of censoring (for the censored observations) and logs of densities (for the uncensored observations).
38Our results are robust to changing the classiﬁcation of these three IPOs.
39See also page 541 of Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) on how to use artiﬁcial regressions to compute the test statistics.
22writer choice. We use the market shares of underwriters as a proxy for their reputation.40
The results in Panel A column (1) show that the choice of underwriter depends on the
size of the issue and the issuer, as suggested by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Beatty
and Welch (1996). We obtain positive coeﬃcients for the variables IEPROC>MEDIAN and
IEMCAP>MEDIAN that indicate IPOs with above-median expected issue proceeds and mar-
ket capitalization. Also, the coeﬃcients of the log of issuers’ sales and the issuers’ total
assets are signiﬁcantly positive.
Columns (2) and (3) of Panel A present estimates for the other ﬁrst stage regressions.
The range center is positively related to the issuer’s earnings per share (EPS), the issuer’s




tW−2m). Issuer size (IEMCAP>MEDIAN)i salso a signiﬁcant determinant of
the fraction of an issuer’s equity sold at the IPO, but with a negative coeﬃcient. In addition,
older ﬁrms sell larger fractions: the fraction sold is positively related to the log of the issuer’s
age Log(AGE).
Panel B of Table 7 reports the estimates for our models of IPO pricing. Column (1) reports
estimates for equation (6), the model without the grey market return. Of the endogenous
variables in this model, only the range center has a coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. The sign of this coeﬃcient is negative: the higher the underwriter sets the price
range, the smaller the subsequent revision of the oﬀer price from the range center. For our
measure of underwriter reputation (UMSHARE), the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient is consistent
with the results of Habib and Ljungqvist (2001).
Price revisions are signiﬁcantly positively related to both secondary and primary market
returns, and to the number of recent IPOs. We include in our regression dependent variables
for the primary market returns on both the Neuer Markt and on Nasdaq. We ﬁnd that
price revisions of Neuer Markt IPOs are signiﬁcantly positively related to initial returns of
recent IPOs in both of these markets. That is, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant cross-market eﬀects. This
relationship is found both for Nasdaq IPOs that occurred during the two months prior to
40While rankings such as that developed by Carter and Manaster (1990) can be used to measure the reputation of underwriters
that are active in the U.S., no such ranking is available for many of the underwriters on the Neuer Markt. Thus, we follow
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and use as a substitute the share of total IPO volume for which an underwriter acts as lead
manager. See Appendix B.
23range setting, and for those that occurred after the range setting. However, this cross-market
eﬀect is signiﬁcant only for issuers in similar industries. While not reported in Table 7, we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relation between IPO pricing on the Neuer Markt and the average initial
return of recent Nasdaq IPOs across all industries.41
Column (2) of Panel B reports the estimates for the pricing model with the grey market
return, equation (7). The explanatory variables of equation (6) all cease to be signiﬁcant
once we include the variable GREY MKT. This suggests that these variables contain no
signiﬁcant information beyond what is impounded in the prices of grey market trading.
Testing the hypotheses HInf
GREY and H
Adj
GREY: We reject the hypothesis HInf
GREY. The latent
price revision PREV∗ is signiﬁcantly related to the price of the last trade in the grey
market prior to the pricing date tP. Indeed, the explanatory power of our model substantially
increases when we include the grey market return (GREY MKT). Thus, when-issued trading
does reveal information of relevance for IPO pricing.
We also reject the hypothesis H
Adj
GREY. The relation between the grey market return and
the price revision is not one-to-one. As indicated by the p-value stated at the bottom of
column (2), the coeﬃcient of the variable GREY MKT is signiﬁcantly smaller than one. In
column (3), we conﬁrm that this ﬁnding is not due to any interaction between this variable
and other explanatory variables. Thus, underwriters do not fully revise the pricing of IPO
shares relative to information revealed through grey market trading. Since our tests and
hypotheses are for the latent price revision, this result is not due to constrained IPO pricing.
Instead, we ﬁnd an “under-revision”, and hence a reduction in IPO proceeds, as if issuers
leave money on the table in order to pay for information that is revealed through grey market
trading. On the surface this is at odds with the fact that this information is freely available.
However, grey market trading may simply reveal information that underwriters need before
this trading begins, in order to set the price ranges at time tW. Such information is not
freely available when it is needed. Hence, underwriters may resort to bookbuilding in order
to obtain the information directly from investors in exchange for informational rents. This
explanation is plausible since the setting of the price ranges represents a potentially impor-
41See Appendix C for a detailed description of how our variables for primary market conditions are formed.
24tant pricing decision: as discussed in Sections 4 and 5, the range may subsequently constrain
the pricing of the IPO. In rejecting the hypothesis H
Adj
GREY,w et hus ﬁnd evidence consistent
with information being gathered directly from investors, as in bookbuilding, despite the fact
that the grey market later reveals this information.
We also conduct a robustness check in order to test whether our results are driven by our
treatment of IPO pricing as being right-censored only. In this robustness check, we regard
IPO pricing as left-censored for IPOs that were priced exactly at the lower bound of the price
range and that had a grey market price strictly below this lower bound. Our qualitative
results remain unchanged. For the speciﬁcation in column (2) of Panel B, the coeﬃcient
of the variable GREY MKT increases to 0.824 with a z-value of 12.95; the coeﬃcient in
column (3) increases to 0.848 with a z-value of 14.21. In both cases, we obtain the same
qualitative result as before: we reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are equal to one.
6.2 IPO Underpricing
In this section, we test the hypotheses HU
REV and HC
REV.A sw ediscussed in Section 5, these
hypotheses concern the informational role of bookbuilding after price ranges are posted, and
thus after grey market trading begins. We test for a relation between initial returns (a proxy
for informational rents received by investors) and a proxy for information i that investors
provide to the underwriters in bookbuilding, after the posting of the range. To construct
the latter proxy, we draw on results of the last section. We assume that model (6) explains
PREV 0, the price revision that would result if underwriters received no information beyond
what is publicly available. Thus, any diﬀerence between PREV 0 and the latent price revision,
PREV∗,i sdue to nonpublic information i. Equation (4) speciﬁes the relation between such
information and initial returns.
To convert equation (4) into an econometric model, we need to address the problem that
we can directly observe the latent price revision PREV∗ only for unconstrained IPOs. For
the other IPOs we draw on information impounded in the grey market prices to estimate
the latent price revision. As argued in the last section, these prices contain information of
relevance for IPO pricing, including non-public information about the value of IPO shares.
25We thus use the model in column (2) of Table 7, Panel B, to compute a measure for the
price revision PREV∗ that would have been observed for IPOs with constrained oﬀer prices,
if pricing had not been restricted by the price ranges.42 We denote this price revision by
PREV G.F or those IPOs that are unconstrained we use the actual price revision, which we
denote simply as PREV.
Substituting PREV and PREV G for PREV∗ in equation (4) we obtain:




γU × (PREV − PREV0)+ U if ICON =0,
γC × (PREVG − PREV0)+δ × (PREV0 − MAXREV)+ C if ICON =1.
(8)
As in the regressions of Table 7, Panel B we normalize the price revisions by the range center.
Thus, PREV 0 is: (latent price revision, if underwriters receive no private information − range
center)/range center. PREV and PREV G are similarly deﬁned, and MAXREV is: (upper
bound of price range − range center)/range center. For all IPOs we calculate PREV 0 using
the model of column (1) of Table 7, Panel B. ICON is a dummy variable that is equal to one
for constrained IPOs and zero for unconstrained IPOs. As described earlier, we categorize
as constrained all IPOs for which the grey market price is above the range and the IPO oﬀer
price is equal to the range maximum.  U and  C denote econometric disturbances.
We will estimate model (8) for two diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we
estimate the model as it is stated. Hence, we regress initial returns on the following variables:
SURP = PREV − PREV 0 denotes the “surprise” component of the price revision of
IPOs with unconstrained oﬀer prices,
SURPG = PREV G − PREV 0 denotes the “surprise” component of the latent price
revision of IPOs with constrained oﬀer prices, and
CEXTENT = PREV 0 − MAXREV denotes the percentage by which oﬀer prices are
constrained, for i =0 .
Upon substituting these variables into model (8), we obtain the following simple model
for initial returns of unconstrained and constrained IPOs:




γU × SURP +  U if ICON =0 ,
γC × SURPG + δ × CEXTENT +  C if ICON =1 .
(8
 )
42We are aware of the resulting errors-in-variables problem (even though the explanatory power of the model in column (2)
of Table 7 is very high). As will be discussed below, we use instrumental variables to address this problem.
26In the second speciﬁcation we will relax several constraints that are implicitly imposed in
model (8). Instead, we will regress initial returns directly on the variables PREV, PREV G,
and CEXTENT as well as on a set of control variables that we used to compute PREV 0.
We thus ease the constraints imposed in model (8) that a number of the coeﬃcients must
be identical (in absolute value). The purpose of this speciﬁcation is to more closely replicate
Hanley’s (1993) test for a partial adjustment phenomenon.
Panel A of Table 8 reports descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables of models (8)
and (8 ). Both groups of IPOs, unconstrained and constrained, exhibit on average positive
latent price revisions related to public information (PREV 0). However, the mean value
of PREV 0 is higher for constrained than unconstrained IPOs. In addition, the surprise
component of the price revision is on average negative for unconstrained IPOs and positive
for constrained IPOs. For the IPOs with constrained oﬀer prices, the fourth column of Panel
A reports the extent to which IPO pricing is constrained: CEXTENT is on average equal to
20.2% of the range center (with a maximum of 113.3%). For issuers this represents foregone
IPO proceeds. After multiplying CEXTENT by issue size for each constrained IPO, we
calculate that, within the set of constrained IPOs, an average of more than 12 million Euros
per IPO were left on the table, due to the policy of not pricing above the range. Across
the 174 IPOs within this set, the total amount of money left on the table is more than two
billion Euros.
Panel B of Table 8 contains the results of our regressions explaining initial returns. Before
estimating models (8) and (8 ), we ﬁrst regress initial returns just on the set of control
variables that captures that part of initial returns, IR0, that can be predicted using publicly
available information. Column (1) reports the results of this regression. The set of control
variables includes all of the variables deﬁned in Panel A of Table 6 as well as a risk measure,
the log of the sales of the issuer (Log(SALES)). We also include the three variables that are
treated as endogenous in the analysis of IPO pricing in the last section: underwriters’ market
share (UMSHARE), the range center (RCENTER), and the fraction of the issuers’ stock
sold (FSOLD). A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test shows that for these regressions we can regard
these variables as exogenous.43 Columns (2) through (4) of Panel B present the results
43In this test, we use the same set of instruments as in the ﬁrst stage regressions in Panel A of Table 7. Hence, we remove
27from estimating models (8) and (8 ). In Column (2) we estimate model (8 ); in column
(3) we estimate the same model but add the control variables that are included in column
(1). In column (4), as discussed above, we estimate a rather standard “partial adjustment”
regression, similar to that proposed by Hanley (1993). In all of these regressions we interact
the explanatory variables from Panel A with either the indicator variable ICON, that indicates
constrained IPOs, or 1 − ICON, that indicates unconstrained IPOs.
The estimates in Table 8 are consistent with a number of ﬁndings of prior studies of IPO
pricing. We ﬁnd that initial returns are positively related to prior market conditions (consis-
tent with ﬁndings of Lowry and Schwert (2002), Loughran and Ritter (2002a) and Bradley
and Jordan (2002) for U.S. markets) and negatively related to the number of recent IPOs
in the same industry (consistent with Booth and Chua (1996) and Benveniste, Ljungqvist,
Wilhelm, and Yu (2003)). Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Loughran and Ritter (2002a,b),
and Bradley and Jordan (2002) ﬁnd evidence of a negative relation between initial returns
and the fraction of an issuer’s outstanding shares that are sold in the IPO (FSOLD). Our
results are consistent with this, but not signiﬁcant.
The estimates in Table 8 are also consistent with a feature of our model: the one-to-one
correspondence between initial returns and the amount of money left on the table due to
constrained IPO pricing, measured by CEXTENT.A s indicated by the p-values at the
bottoms of columns (2) and (3) of Table 8 Panel B, we are unable to reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcient on CEXTENT, δ,i sequal to one.
Econometric robustness checks: Columns (5) and (6) present econometric robustness checks.
In column (5), we report GLS estimates in order to check for eﬀects of heteroscedasticity. We
allow for a diﬀerent disturbance variance across the two groups of IPOs with un-/constrained
oﬀer prices. While the disturbance variance is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the two groups,
the estimated coeﬃcients of the price revision variables are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
those in column (4).
In column (6) we check whether attenuation bias or simultaneity bias aﬀects our results.
the variable Log(SALES) from the underpricing regressions of Table 8, Panel B. For these models, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests
fail to reject the exogeneity of the variables UMSHARE, RCENTER, and FSOLD.
28Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) point out that the price revision PREV∗ is endogenous to
the initial return IR, resulting in a simultaneity bias of the coeﬃcients when model (8) is
estimated using OLS. In addition, we face an errors-in-variables problem stemming from
measurement errors in the variable PREV G that may give rise to attenuation bias. To
check whether biased coeﬃcients aﬀect our results, we use two instruments for each of the
variables PREV and PREV G. The ﬁrst of these instruments is the expected price revision
PREV 0,a shas been suggested by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). The second instrument
exploits higher moment information to improve estimation eﬃciency. As suggested by Lewbel
(1997), we construct two higher moment instruments by subtracting the means from, and
then squaring, each of the price revision variables PREV and PREV G.44 The instrumental
variables estimates of the coeﬃcients of the price revision variables are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from those of column (4).
Testing the hypotheses HU
REV and HC
REV: As discussed in Section 5, if we reject the hy-
potheses HU
REV and HC
REV,i nf avoro fthe alternatives of γU > 0 and γC > 1, then this
is consistent with an informational role of bookbuilding, during the time in which the grey
market is open. We are, however, unable to reject HU
REV or HC
REV. According to the p-
values stated at the bottom of Table 8 Panel B, the coeﬃcients γU and γC of the surprise
variables SURP and SURPG are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and one, respectively.
Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence of an informational role of bookbuilding after the opening of the
grey market. This is the case both for unconstrained IPOs, for which we can directly observe
the latent price revision (PREV∗ = PREV), and for constrained IPOs, for which we must
estimate the latent price revision (PREV∗ = PREV G). Consistent with this result, the
coeﬃcients of the price revision variables PREV and PREV G in columns (4)-(6) of Table
8, Panel B are also not signiﬁcantly larger than zero and one respectively. Hence, we ﬁnd
no “partial adjustment eﬀect” of the form deﬁned by Hanley (1993).
44Alternatively, we could address the errors-in-variables problem by adjusting the standard errors using Murphy-Topel es-
timates. In contrast to the instrumental variables approach, the latter approach merely raises the estimated standard errors
of the coeﬃcients without changing the point estimates. As a consequence, our results would be strengthened since we would
obtain wider conﬁdence intervals. In order to be conservative, we abstain from such an adjustment: instead we report “naive”
standard errors.
29Interpretation: In interpreting this result, there are two possible explanations. First, it may
be that after the opening of the grey market, underwriters simply do not gather information
through bookbuilding. That is, underwriters may have already completed their (direct)
information gathering activities by the time that they set the price ranges. Second, it may
be the case that underwriters obtain some information from investors after setting the price
ranges, but this information is also contained in the grey market prices. Since these prices are
freely and publicly available, the investors do not receive rents for providing the information.
Thus, we may fail to reject hypotheses HU
REV and HC
REV for reasons related to either part
of these joint hypotheses: after setting the price ranges, underwriters may no longer gather
information (i = 0), or if they do, they may get the information for free (β = 1).45 Either
way,w efail to ﬁnd evidence for the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model of how underwriters
gather costly information, through bookbuilding after the onset of grey market trading.
Ap ossible alternative interpretation of this result is suggested by Ljungqvist, Jenkinson
and Wilhelm (2001). They provide evidence that underwriters outside the U.S. may lack
both competence and informed investors to talk to. That is, underwriters may simply be
unable to gather information directly from investors. In order to investigate whether our
interpretation has explanatory power beyond that of the arguments given by Ljungqvist,
Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2001), we conducted a robustness check. We repeated our analysis
but included only those IPOs that were lead managed by the banks which are most likely
to have U.S. experience in IPO pricing and/or contact with sophisticated investors.46 The
main results of our analysis were unchanged. (We do not report the details of the regressions
in this paper, but they can be obtained from the authors.) It appears that even experienced
underwriters do not ﬁnd it eﬃcient to gather information through bookbuilding after the
45These alternative explanations for our ﬁndings are put into perspective by the ﬁndings of Jenkinson and Jones (2002).
They analyze the books of 27 European IPOs and ﬁnd that only 7% of the bids are price sensitive. Since these bids are placed
in bookbuilding after the opening of the when-issued market, this ﬁnding is consistent with such bookbuilding not serving an
informational purpose.
46We included in our robustness check data for IPOs lead managed by banks which have a Carter-Manaster ranking, as stated
in Table A of the Appendix. We also included IPOs underwritten by the “DG Bank AG”. Our sample for this robustness check
includes 164 IPOs. Even though no Carter-Manaster ranking is available for DG Bank AG, it has served as lead manager in
more IPOs than any other underwriter on the Neuer Markt, and so is more likely to have developed a network of experienced
investors. In addition, including these 31 observations allowed us to repeat our analysis without convergence problems in the
maximum likelihood estimation of model (6).
30opening of when-issued trading.47
A second alternative explanation that has been suggested is that investors who provide
information after the opening of grey market trading may be rewarded simply by receiving
larger allocations.48 We are unable to test this directly, however, the absence of any partial
adjustment eﬀect suggests that the total amount of money paid to investors who provide
information is not adjusted relative to information learned after grey market trading starts.
Thus, if investors who provide late information are rewarded, perhaps with larger allocations,
then this entails a redistribution of the total reward for information. While we cannot say
unequivocally that this is suboptimal, we cannot think of any optimal mechanism that would
lead to such a policy. Thus, the most logical explanation for our empirical results is that
investors do not receive payment for information provided after grey market trading starts.
7 Conclusion
In the German IPO market there is no partial adjustment phenomenon, as has been docu-
mented in the U.S. IPO market. This is despite the fact that, as in the U.S., bookbuilding
is the method of choice for pricing and marketing IPOs. Thus, it appears that bookbuilding
in Germany is not the same as bookbuilding in the U.S.
To understand how IPOs are priced in the German market, we now bring together the
results of the two parts of this paper: the results on the relation between IPO pricing and the
prices of shares in the pre-IPO when-issued market, and the results on IPO pricing relative
to price ranges set just before this market opens. When put together, these results shed
light on how the existence of a liquid when-issued market aﬀects IPO pricing. We ﬁnd that
underwriters do not fully revise IPO oﬀer prices with respect to information impounded
in prices in the when-issued market. Consistent with the theory of Benveniste and Spindt
(1989), this “under-revision” can be interpreted as evidence of rents that investors receive for
providing underwriters with information. However, such rents are not paid for information
that underwriters obtain after the opening of when-issued trading. Otherwise, we should
47Note, this result is not inconsistent with Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2001), because it relates only to information
gathering after the opening of when-issued trading.
48We thank David Goldreich for suggesting that we address this possibility.
31ﬁnd a partial adjustment phenomenon as deﬁned by Hanley (1993). The lack of such a
phenomenon suggests that, in the presence of when-issued trading, bookbuilding is not a
source of costly information for IPO pricing. Any such informational role of bookbuilding is
therefore conﬁned to the period before the opening of the when-issued market. Indeed, our
ﬁndings suggest that underwriters do gather information through bookbuilding in order to
set price ranges before when-issued trading begins.
Our ﬁndings raise the question of why underwriters seem unable to just wait for all
relevant information to be revealed through when-issued trading. Put diﬀerently, why do
underwriters not set arbitrarily wide ranges, so as not to constrain IPO pricing prior to learn-
ing information from when-issued trading? We believe that this is because of externalities
of the bookbuilding process, in the absence of which when-issued trading cannot open. In
setting price ranges, underwriters give publicly observable indications of the likely value of
IPO shares. Such revelation of information can mitigate informational asymmetries across
traders in the when-issued market, and thus facilitate the opening of the market. This ar-
gument is consistent with three stylized facts. First, when-issued trading never opens before
the underwriter posts the price range. Second, price ranges vary across IPOs, perhaps due to
information that underwriters obtain through bookbuilding before they set the range. Third,
the setting of a price range is not just “cheap talk”, since the range imposes a potentially
costly constraint on the subsequent pricing of the IPO. This last fact has two implications.
First, there is a value to gathering information before setting the range. Second, the range
is a signal of information held by the underwriter.
Our results are also of relevance for our understanding of IPO pricing on markets without
when-issued trading. Speciﬁcally, we provide an indirect validation of the common inter-
pretation of a well-documented empirical regularity: the partial adjustment phenomenon
(Hanley (1993)). This phenomenon is typically interpreted as evidence that underwriters
pay informational rents to investors who submit informative orders for IPO shares during
the bookbuilding process. The institutional framework in Germany allows us to test and
conﬁrm this interpretation. Our test relies on the hypothesis that when-issued trading of
IPO shares reveals investors’ private information for free. If so, then there is no need to pay
32them informational rents after when-issued trading commences. Since when-issued trading
commences immediately after the posting of ranges, the German market should therefore
not exhibit a partial adjustment phenomenon. And indeed, we ﬁnd no evidence of such a
phenomenon in Germany. This contrast between the German and U.S. IPO markets bolsters
the interpretation that the partial adjustment phenomenon found in the U.S. is due to infor-
mational rents that are paid to investors who provide information during the bookbuilding
process.
An umber of open questions remain. Most importantly, we cannot determine from our
data whether when-issued trading enhances the eﬃciency of IPO pricing. Based on our
results, it is plausible that the existence of the when-issued market lowers the cost of infor-
mation gathering. Even if when-issued trading is not able to fully supplant bookbuilding as
a source of information for pricing, it may allow underwriters to reduce the scale of costly
information gathering through bookbuilding. Thus, allowing for when-issued trading may
beneﬁt issuers. Alternatively, it is also possible that when-issued trading interferes with in-
formation gathering through bookbuilding. For example, investors may conceal information
about the value of IPO shares in order to realize proﬁts by trading in the when-issued mar-
ket. To obtain information from the investors in spite of this, underwriters may have to oﬀer
them higher informational rents. Recent theoretical work (discussed in the introduction)
tends to support the former rather than the latter argument. In addition, we ﬁnd that even
after taking into account the lower fraction of internet IPOs on the German Neuer Markt,
average underpricing on the Neuer Markt was lower than on Nasdaq for the years 1999 and
2000. This could, however, be due to factors other than the existence of a when-issued mar-
ket. In order to test whether the presence of when-issued trading is beneﬁcial for issuers,
we would need a more controlled experiment than what is provided by a simple comparison
of two diﬀerent markets. We thus leave this question open for future research, although we
believe that our ﬁndings represent an important step towards an answer.
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A: Development of the IPO pricing model
Our model of IPO pricing, equation (6), is inﬂuenced by a number of other papers on IPO
underpricing and IPO pricing. The ﬁrst group of papers proposes underwriter reputation
as an explanatory variable for the (under)pricing of IPOs. While rankings such as that devel-
oped by Carter and Manaster (1990) can be used to measure the reputation of underwriters
that are active in the U.S., no such ranking is available for many of the underwriters on the
Neuer Markt. Thus, we follow Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and use as a substitute the
share of total IPO volume (in Euros) for which an underwriter acts as lead manager. The
idea behind this alternative measure is that a high market share commits underwriters to
honor implicit contracts between themselves and investors. To measure underwriters’ market
share, we construct the variable UMSHARE as described in Appendix B.
Carter and Manaster (1990), Booth and Chua (1996) and Lowry and Schwert (2002)
ﬁnd, consistent with Titman and Trueman’s (1986) model, that initial returns are negatively
related to underwriter reputation. Using only data from the 1990’s, Beatty and Welch (1996)
and Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) ﬁnd a positive relation. However, Habib and Ljungqvist
also provide evidence that the choice of underwriter is endogenous. To avoid an endogeneity
bias, we therefore instrument underwriter choice. The set of instruments is based on the
notion that renowned underwriters may be chosen for IPOs that are expected to generate
higher proceeds (Habib and Ljungqvist (2001)) or for IPOs of larger issuers (Beatty and
Welch (1996)). As instruments we use indicator variables for whether an issuer intends to
sell a high fraction of its equity (IFSOLD>MEDIAN), whether the expected proceeds are above
the median (IEPROC>MEDIAN), whether the issuer’s expected market capitalization is above
the median (IEMCAP>MEDIAN), the log of the sales of the issuer (Log(SALES)), the issuer’s
total assets (ASSETS), and indicators for the issuer’s industry aﬃliation and whether the
issuer is headquartered outside Germany (IINTERNET, IHIGHTECH, and IFOREIGN). Of this
set of instruments, we use as identifying variables IFSOLD>MEDIAN, IEPROC>MEDIAN, and
Log(SALES). These three variables are excluded from our empirical model, other than
34acting as explanatory variables for underwriter choice.49 In modeling the underwriter choice
we also control for ﬁxed eﬀects for IPOs in diﬀerent months.
A second body of studies is related to the eﬀect on underpricing of the IPO pricing pro-
cess prior to the posting of the price range at time tW.F or U.S. IPOs, Bradley and
Jordan (2002) and Boehmer and Fishe (2001) consider the relation between range amend-
ments and initial returns. Both studies ﬁnd that this relation is signiﬁcantly positive but
convex in that it is stronger for positive than for negative range amendments. Even though
we are modeling IPO pricing (instead of underpricing), this suggests that range amendments
may have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. On the Neuer Markt range amendments are rare. (We found
only three range amendments in 1999 and 2000.) However, as discussed earlier, we expect
that underwriters do collect information prior to setting the price ranges, just as underwriters
collect information prior to amending ranges in the U.S. Therefore, we use the range center
(RCENTER)a sa nexplanatory variable for the subsequent price revision. Since the range
center is endogenous to the pricing process, we instrument it using as instrumental variables
both issuer characteristics and variables that serve as proxies for the primary market condi-
tions and for IPO activity during the two months prior to the range posting (the variables
with the subscript tW −2m deﬁned in Panel A of Table 6). The identifying variables are the
earnings per share of the issuer (EPS) and an indicator variable IEPS>0 that equals one for
issuers with positive earnings.
A third group of papers analyzes the relation between IPO underpricing and the fraction
of equity sold at the IPO. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Loughran and Ritter (2002a)
and (2002b), and Bradley and Jordan (2002) ﬁnd that initial returns are negatively related
to the fraction of an issuer’s outstanding shares that are sold at the IPO (FSOLD). We
again are concerned that this variable is endogenous to the pricing process. It is likely that
the range center and the fraction sold are joint decisions, as both numbers are ﬁrst posted in
the same ﬁling. Thus, we instrument these two variables in similar ways, the only diﬀerence
being that the identifying variable for FSOLD is the log of the issuer’s age (Log(AGE)),
while RCENTER is identiﬁed by the issuer’s earnings per share (EPS, IEPS>0). Moreover,
we allow for correlation between the residuals of the ﬁrst stage regressions. This can be
49We test these exclusion restrictions as part of testing the model’s overidentifying restrictions.
35interpreted as an unrestricted reduced form of a structural model simultaneously explaining
the range center and the fraction sold.50
The next group of papers deals with the eﬀect of primary and secondary market
conditions on IPO underpricing. Bradley and Jordan (2002), Loughran and Ritter (2002a)
and Lowry and Schwert (2002) all found that initial returns are positively related to the
performance of secondary market indices prior to the IPOs. The latter two papers also allow
this relation to be piecewise linear and ﬁnd that it is strongest for positive secondary market
returns. Furthermore, Bradley and Jordan (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2002) show that
initial returns are also positively related to primary market conditions, i.e. the average
initial returns of recent IPOs. Given these results, we allow for a piecewise linear relation
of the price revision to both primary and secondary market performance. To obtain indices
for primary market conditions, we compute for each IPO in our sample the average initial
return of “similar” IPOs on the Neuer Markt and Nasdaq that occurred during the period
between setting the price range (at tW) and setting the oﬀer price (at tP). These indices
are denoted respectively as ¯ IR
NM
tW→tP and ¯ IR
NQ
tW→tP.W e also compute indices for primary





tW−2m. IPOs are “similar” if they have the same industry classiﬁcation (e.g., hightech and
internet). In Appendix C we describe in detail how we construct these indices for primary
market conditions. In addition, we use the return of the Neuer Markt All Share Index during
the period between setting the price range and setting the oﬀer price (IXtW→tP)t ocontrol
for secondary market performance.51
Finally, we take into account ﬁndings by Booth and Chua (1996) and Benveniste, Ljungqvist,
Wilhelm and Yu (2003) that initial returns are negatively related to the number of recent
IPOs in the same industry.52 To capture this eﬀect, we include as measures for IPO activ-
ity the number of IPOs by issuers in the same industry that occurred on the Neuer Markt
50Strictly speaking, the same explanatory variables should be used in both equations of such an unrestricted reduced form.
We check, and conﬁrm, that the identifying variables for RCENTER and FSOLDare not signiﬁcantly related to the respective
other variable.
51Like Lowry and Schwert (2002), we include in our regressions not only the indices for primary and secondary market
performance but also interactions of these indices with dummy variables indicating above-median-level market performance: in
Table 7, these interactions are denoted as IX+
tW →tP , ¯ IR
NM+
tW →tP , and ¯ IR
NQ+
tW →tP .
52Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm (2002) provide a rationale for this. They argue that underwriters bundle IPOs in the
same industry to economize on costs of information production and thus reduce IPO underpricing.
36during the period between setting the price range and setting the oﬀer price (NNM
tW→tP) and
in the two months before (NNM
tW−2m).
We do not include data on withdrawn oﬀerings. However, as argued by Benveniste,
Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu (2003) this is endogenous and we do include many of the
variables that they use to explain the probability of withdrawal. In addition, we have run a
robustness check of our results by repeating our analysis using only data for the year 1999
and then only data for 2000. As there were almost no withdrawals in 1999 but a number in
2000, we should obtain diﬀerent results for these two years if withdrawals matter. However,
the results are qualitatively the same for both years.
37Appendix B: Underwriters on the Neuer Markt
Table A summarizes data on the banks that were active as lead underwriters in the Neuer Markt IPO
market from February 1999 to December 2000. Close to half of the IPOs (115 out of 253) were lead
managed by banks that do not have a Carter-Manaster rank assigned to them, presumably because these
banks have not been active in U.S. IPO markets. For this reason, we use market share as a proxy for
underwriter reputation in our regressions. The market share of a particular underwriter is deﬁned as the
total proceeds of IPOs on the Neuer Markt featuring this underwriter as lead or co-lead manager divided
by the total proceeds of all Neuer Markt IPOs in this period. Proceeds are deﬁned as the oﬀer price times
the number of shares sold at the IPO, including shares sold under the greenshoe option. If an IPO has a lead
and a co-lead manager, half of the proceeds contribute to the market share order of each underwriter. “C-M
Rank” is Jay Ritter’s update of the Carter-Manaster reputation ranking, taken from Ritter’s homepage:
http://bear.cba.uﬂ.edu/ritter/rank.htm.
Table A: Underwriters on the Neuer Markt
Market share No of IPOs as No of IPOs as C-M
Underwriter UMSHARE (%) lead manager co-lead manager Rank
Dresdner Bank AG 13.14 16 1 7
Goldman, Sachs & Co. 11.99 5 2 9
Commerzbank AG 10.81 23 2 7
DG Bank AG 9.81 31 5 none
Deutsche Bank AG 9.55 16 4 9
Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG 6.76 19 2 none
WestLB 4.11 13 0 5
BHF-Bank AG 2.91 11 0 6
Credit Suisse First Boston 2.57 7 0 9
Baden-W¨ urttembergische Bank AG 2.54 7 1 none
Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. KGaA 2.52 10 1 none
HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt KGaA 2.11 12 0 8
BNP Paribas Group 2.10 7 0 7
Bank J. Vontobel & Co. AG 1.69 4 1 6
Morgan Stanley Bank AG 1.65 3 0 9
Gontard & Metallbank AG 1.52 10 0 none
Salomon Smith Barney International 1.33 2 0 9
UBS Warburg 1.24 1 0 8
Norddeutsche LB Girozentrale 1.18 6 1 none
Concord Eﬀekten AG 1.12 8 0 none
BancBoston Robertson Stephens 1.05 3 0 8
Warburg Dillon Read 0.87 1 1 8
Merrill Lynch International 0.83 2 0 9
M.M. Warburg & Co. KGaA 0.78 5 0 none
LB Baden-W¨ urttemberg 0.75 4 1 none
LB Rheinland -Pfalz Girozentrale 0.52 0 1 5
Market share < 0.5%: 20 underwriters 4.55(a) 27 4 (b)
Total 100.00 253 27
(a) This is the cumulative market share of all underwriters with a market share below 0.5%. The
value of the variable UMSHARE for each of these underwriters is <0.5.
(b)2 underwriters have a ranking of 9, 2 have a ranking of 8, 1 has a ranking of 7,
the remainder have no ranking.
38Appendix C: Indices for Primary Market Conditions and IPO Activity
To construct indices for primary market conditions, we ﬁrst identify for each IPO on the
Neuer Markt, (i) an industry classiﬁcation for that IPO, determined by the values of both
industry indicator variables IHIGHTECH and IINTERNET, (ii) the time tW at which the price
range has been set, and (iii) the time of pricing, tP.W e then identify all IPOs with the
same industry classiﬁcation that started trading on Nasdaq or the Neuer Markt (i) during
the two months before time tW and (ii) between time tW and time tP.53 Finally, we count
these IPOs and compute the average initial return. The count is denoted as NMKT
tW−2m and
NMKT
tW→tP respectively, and the average initial return is denoted as ¯ IR
MKT
tW−2m and ¯ IR
MKT
tW→tP
respectively, where MKT ∈{ NM,NQ} indicates whether the variable refers to IPOs on
the Neuer Markt (NM)o ro nNasdaq (NQ).
In constructing these variables we needed to address the fact that there were periods
during which there were no IPOs with the same industry classiﬁcation as an IPO on the
Neuer Markt. For each of our IPOs, there was at least one similar IPO on Nasdaq during
the two months prior to setting the price range (tW −2m), and for all but eight there was at
least one IPO on the Neuer Markt during this period. However, for 109 of our IPOs there
were no Neuer Markt IPOs during the period tW → tP, and for 65 of our IPOs there were
no Nasdaq IPOs during this period. (27 of our IPOs had neither a Neuer Markt or Nasdaq
IPO during this period.) We ﬁll the missing values for each index with the average of all
other (non-missing) values of that index across IPOs with the same industry classiﬁcation.
This strategy for ﬁlling in the missing values avoids introducing a bias into the coeﬃcient of
that index in our regressions.54
53For IPOs to match on the industry classiﬁcation, they must match on both categories: hightech and internet.
54We thank Jay Ritter for suggesting this strategy for dealing with missing values.
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42Table 1
Size of diﬀerent IPO markets (number of IPOs)
Market 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
NYSE 88 87 68 49 48
Nasdaq 680 494 273 485 397
AMEX 18 22 21 11 6
Frankfurt - Neuer Markt 0 12 41 131 132
Frankfurt - Amtlicher Handel n.a. 10 16 27 15
LSE (UK only) 230 135 124 106 172
LSE (International) 52 41 33 28 38
Paris (Premier and Second Marches) n.a. n.a. 83 34 28




Criteria: Nasdaq Neuer Markt
Issuer: operating history* 1 year 3 years
assets/equity** net tangible assets US$4 million equity EUR 1.5 million
or market cap. US$50 million
proﬁtability net income US$750,000
Issue: size EUR 5 million
free ﬂoat*** US$5 million 25% of market cap.
market makers 3 2
*At Nasdaq, the operating history must exceed 1 year for issuers with a market capitalization below
US$50 million.
**At the Neuer Markt, issuers’ equity must exceed EUR 1.5 million at the time of the application for
listing.
***At the Neuer Markt (Nasdaq), free ﬂoat comprises shares held by beneﬁcial owners of less than 5%
(10%) of the equity, not including executive ownership. A smaller ﬂoat of only 10% is required for Neuer
Markt issues with a market cap above EUR 100 million.
43Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
This table provides summary statistics for IPOs on the Neuer Markt and Nasdaq from February
1999 through December 2000. In both panels and in each market, IPO ﬁrms are categorized ac-
cording two criteria: hightech versus non-hightech and internet versus non-internet. To identify
Neuer Markt hightech ﬁrms the hightech industry description in Appendix 4 of Loughran and
Ritter (2002b) is used. Neuer Markt IPOs are deﬁned as internet ﬁrms if the NEMAX industry
classiﬁcation is internet. To identify Nasdaq hightech ﬁrms we use the SIC codes and the hightech
industry description in Appendix 4 of Loughran and Ritter (2002b); for Nasdaq internet IPOs we
use the list of internet IPOs from Jay Ritter’s homepage (http://bear.cba.uﬂ.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm).
Panel A. The issue size is the oﬀer price times the number of shares sold at the IPO, not
including the greenshoe option (million Euros for Neuer Markt IPOs and million US$ for Nasdaq
IPOs).
Panel B. The market capitalization is the oﬀer price times the number of shares outstanding
after the IPO, not including any shares issued under the greenshoe option (million Euros for
Neuer Markt IPOs and million US$ for Nasdaq IPOs). Fraction sold is 100% × the number of
shares sold at the IPO divided by the number of shares outstanding.
Panel A: Issue Size
Non- Non-
Total Hightech Hightech Internet Internet
Neuer Markt Mean 69.9 66.3 78.9 112.9 58.2
(million Euros) Std.Dev. 171.4 186.1 127.9 342.3 73.3
Median 38.8 39.9 35.9 45.4 37.8
Minimum 8.0 8.0 9.5 9.5 8.0
Maximum 2,489.4 2,489.4 790.5 2,489.4 790.5
Total 17,674.4 11,992.3 5,682.1 6,095.8 11,578.6
100.0 % 67.9 % 32.1 % 34.5 % 65.5 %
No. of IPOs 253 181 72 54 199
Nasdaq Mean 97.0 94.4 101.1 94.5 99.5
(million US$) Std.Dev. 161.6 103.8 225.0 130.2 188.1
Median 67.2 67.2 67.0 67.8 65.0
Minimum 5.0 5.0 5.3 6.0 5.0
Maximum 3,230.0 1,138.5 3,230.0 1,913.0 3,230.0
Total 74,378.3 44,447.3 29,931.0 36,273.8 38,104.4
100.0 % 59.76 % 40.24 % 48.77 % 51.23 %
No. of IPOs 767 471 296 384 383
44Table 3 (continued)
Panel B: Market Capitalization and Fraction Sold
Non- Non-
Total Hightech Hightech Internet Internet
Neuer Markt Market Cap. Mean 351.7 348.9 358.9 835.1 220.6
(million Euros) Std.Dev. 1,745.3 2,000.6 814.8 3,703.4 352.7
Median 136.5 135.0 154.1 193.8 133.3
Minimum 26.4 26.4 33.8 38.3 26.4
Maximum 27,000.0 27,000.0 5,472.0 27,000.0 4,355.5
Fraction Sold Mean 28.2 28.6 27.1 24.6 29.2
(%) Std.Dev. 7.9 8.0 7.4 5.0 8.3
Median 26.6 26.6 26.7 24.2 28.0
Minimum 6.1 9.2 6.1 9.2 6.1
Maximum 66.7 66.7 46.0 35.9 66.7
No. of IPOs 253 181 72 54 199
Nasdaq Market Cap. Mean 563.7 645.0 434.4 599.2 528.2
(million US$) Std.Dev. 1,087.2 1,336.5 443.0 832.4 1,293.5
Median 339.7 367.4 302.0 382.0 297.6
Minimum 11.0 13.4 11.0 13.2 11.0
Maximum 21,315.0 21,315.0 3,231.0 11,837.9 21,315.0
Fraction Sold Mean 21.9 20.2 24.7 19.7 24.2
(%) Std.Dev. 11.1 9.3 13.0 9.9 11.7
Median 19.9 18.8 22.2 17.8 21.9
Minimum 4.1 4.1 7.0 5.4 4.1
Maximum 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
No. of IPOs 767 471 296 384 383
45Table 4
Neuer Markt Oﬀer Prices and Grey Market Prices, relative to Ranges
Panel A shows how IPOs are priced relative to the price ranges.
Panel B shows how underwriters set the oﬀer price, given the price at which IPO shares trade
in the when-issued market.
Panel A: IPO Pricing relative to Ranges






Panel B: IPO Pricing relative Ranges and Grey Market Prices
Number of IPOs (Percent of Subsample)
grey market price: oﬀer < min oﬀer = min min <oﬀer < max oﬀer = max Total
below range 7 (50.0%) 5 (35.7%) 2 (14.3%) 0 (0%) 14 (100%)
within range 2 (3.5%) 19 (32.8%) 30 (51.7%) 7 (12.1%) 58 (100%)
above range 0 (0%) 1 (0.6%) 11 (6.1%) 169 (93.4%) 181 (100%)
46Table 5
Summary statistics for Neuer Markt IPOs:
Pricing Relative to Grey Market Prices and Initial Returns
In this table, IPOs are divided into constrained and unconstrained IPOs. To identify constrained
IPOs two criteria are used: First, the oﬀer price of an IPO must equal the upper bound of the
price range, and second, a price higher than this upper bound must have been paid for shares in
the last grey market transaction prior to the pricing date
Panel A presents summary statistics on the pricing of IPOs relative to grey market prices,
deﬁned as 100(%)x(oﬀer price – last grey market price before tP)/last grey market price before
tP.
Panel B presents summary statistics the initial returns of IPOs. Initial returns are deﬁned as
100(%)x(1st day close at time tC – oﬀer price)/oﬀer price.
Panel A: Pricing Relative to Grey Market Prices (%)
100(%)x(OFFER – last grey mkt price before tP)/last grey mkt price before tP
Total unconstrained IPOs constrained IPOs
Mean -21.89 -4.50 -29.78
Std.Dev. 21.42 9.75 20.61
Median -16.33 -2.56 -25.95
Minimum -79.84 -29.27 -79.84
Maximum 26.32 26.32 0.00
No. of IPOs 253 79 174
Panel B: Initial Returns (%)
IR=100(%)x(1stCLOSE – OFFER)/OFFER
Total unconstrained IPOs constrained IPOs
Mean 46.66 1.70 67.07
Std.Dev. 71.78 14.84 77.88
Median 19.57 0.39 38.00
Minimum -30.00 -30.00 -13.00
Maximum 444.44 63.00 444.44
No. of IPOs 253 79 174
47Table 6
Variables for IPO Pricing Model
Table 6, Panel A: Explanatory Variables IPO Pricing
Underwriter reputation:
ˆ UMSHARE Underwriter market share (%), (See details in Appendix B)
instrumented as stated in Panel B of Table 6.
IPO pricing process up to range setting (at time tW):
ˆ RCENTER Center of price range,
instrumented as stated in Panel B of Table 6
Issue(r) characteristics:
ˆ FSOLD Fraction of issuer’s stock sold at the IPO
= 100% ×(# of shares sold)÷(# of shares outstanding after the IPO, excluding the greenshoe),
instrumented as stated in Panel B of Table 6
IINTERNET Dummy variable indicating internet IPOs
IHIGHTECH Dummy variable indicating hightech IPOs
Primary and secondary market conditions: (See details in Appendix B)
IXtW→tP Return on the Neuer Markt All Share Index after the posting of the range and before tP
¯ IR
NM
tW→tP Average initial return of Neuer Markt IPOs after the posting of the range and before tP
¯ IR
NQ
tW→tP Average initial return of Nasdaq IPOs after the posting of the range and before tP
¯ IR
NM
tW−2m Average initial return of Neuer Markt IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
¯ IR
NQ
tW−2m Average initial return of Nasdaq IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
IPO activity:
NNM
tW→tP Number of Neuer Markt IPOs after the posting of the range and before tP
NNM
tW−2m Number of Neuer Markt IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
Grey market return:
GREY MKT 100%×(last grey market price before tP – RCENTER)÷ RCENTER
48Table 6, Panel B: Instruments for Endogenous Explanatory Variables
Identifying Variables are indicated in boldface.
Underwriter Market Share, UMSHARE:
IFSOLD>MEDIAN Dummy variable indicating IPOs with above-median FSOLD
IEPROC>MEDIAN Dummy variable indicating IPOs with above-median expected proceeds(a)
IEMCAP>MEDIAN Dummy variable indicating IPOs with above-median expected capitalization(a)
Log(SALES) Log of sales of the issuer in the year prior to the IPO
ASSETS Total assets of the issuer
IFOREIGN Dummy variable indicating IPOs by foreign issuers
IINTERNET Dummy variable indicating internet IPOs
IHIGHTECH Dummy variable indicating hightech IPOs
Monthly ﬁxed eﬀects Dummy variables indicating the month of the ﬁrst 2ndary market trading day
Center of Price Range, RCENTER:
IEMCAP>MEDIAN Dummy variable indicating IPOs with above-median expected capitalization(a)
EPS Earnings per share
EPS ∗ IEPS>0 Earnings per share interacted with a dummy indicating IPOs
by issuers with positive EPS
ASSETS Total assets of the issuer
IFOREIGN Dummy variable indicating IPOs by foreign issuers
IINTERNET Dummy variable indicating internet IPOs
IHIGHTECH Dummy variable indicating hightech IPOs
¯ IR
NM
tW−2m Average initial return of Neuer Markt IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
¯ IR
NQ
tW−2m Average initial return of Nasdaq IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
NNM
tW−2m Number of Neuer Markt IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
N
NQ
tW−2m Number of Nasdaq IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
Fraction of Issuer’s Stock sold in the IPO, FSOLD:
IEMCAP>MEDIAN Dummy variable indicating IPOs with below-median expected capitalization(a)
Log(AGE) Log of the age of the issuer (in years)
ASSETS Total assets of the issuer
IFOREIGN Dummy variable indicating IPOs by foreign issuers
IINTERNET Dummy variable indicating internet IPOs
IHIGHTECH Dummy variable indicating hightech IPOs
¯ IR
NM
tW−2m Average initial return of Neuer Markt IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
¯ IR
NQ
tW−2m Average initial return of Nasdaq IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
NNM
tW−2m Number of Neuer Markt IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
N
NQ
tW−2m Number of Nasdaq IPOs during the 2 months
before the posting of the range
(a) The term “expected” is used, because these values are calculated using the range center
as the expected oﬀer price.
49Table 7
Price-Range-to-Oﬀer-Price Revision
Panel A reports ﬁrst-stage models for the 2SLS models in Panel (B). Column (1) states ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) estimates
for underwriter market share, UMSHARE. (The regression controls for ﬁxed eﬀects of IPOs in diﬀerent months.)
Columns (2) and (3) report SUR estimates: in column (2), the dependent variable RCENTER is the center of the
price range; in column (3), the dependent variable FSOLD is the percent of an issuer’s stock sold at the IPO. These
dependent variables are precisely deﬁned in Panel A of Table 6; all explanatory variables are deﬁned in Panel B of
Table 6. Identifying variables are printed in boldface. t-statistics are reported in parentheses for column (1) and
Z-statistics for columns (2) and (3).
Panel B reports generalized TOBIT regressions (interval regressions INTREG) where the dependent variable
PREV
∗ (latent price revision) is the percentage revision of the latent oﬀer price from the center of the indicative price
range. For each IPO, this variable is censored at a diﬀerent point, given by the upper bound of the respective price
range. There are three endogenous right-hand-side variables, UMSHARE, RCENTER, and FSOLD, instrumented
using the models in Panel A as the ﬁrst stage. All other right-hand-side variables are deﬁned in Panel A of Table
6. Variables with the superscript “+” equal the variables without this superscript whenever these variables take
values exceeding their 50th percentile and equal zero otherwise. In estimating these models, we assume multiplicative
conditional heteroskedasticity speciﬁed by our four industry categories and the year of issue. Z-statistics for robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
50Table 7, Panel A
FE SUR
Underwriter Range Fraction
Dependent Variable market share center sold






































IINTERNET -0.642 -0.334 -1.459
(-0.26) (-0.08) (0.50)
IHIGHTECH -0.654 -0.172 1.245
(-1.51) (-0.09) (0.88)




















tW −2m 0.008 -0.021
(0.11) (-0.42)
Corr. of residuals -0.152
b
p: all coeﬀ. equal 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
F/χ2 13.90 (F) 121.00 79.42
R
2 23.7% 32.0% 24.1%




51Table 7: Panel B
Dependent variable: PREV




Intercept 15.228 0.471 -0.872
(0.87) (0.06) (-1.60)




ˆ RCENTER (EUR) -0.580
c -0.287
(-1.68) (-1.54)
ˆ UMSHARE (%) -0.111 0.690
(-0.10) (1.24)








IHIGHTECH × IINTERNET 4.752 -6.680
(0.39) (-1.25)
Secondary market index:































































p: zero coeﬀ. of IXtW →tP + IX
+
tW →tP 0.561 0.196
p: zero coeﬀ. of ¯ IR
NM
tW →tP + ¯ IR
NM+
tW →tP 0.012 0.233
p: zero coeﬀ. of ¯ IR
NQ
tW →tP + ¯ IR
NQ+
tW →tP 0.013 0.994
p: zero coeﬀ. of industry dummies 0.014 0.177
p: zero coeﬀ. of primary market indices 0.000 0.201
p: coeﬀ. of GREY MKT equals 1 0.000 0.000
p: all coeﬀ. equal 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
χ2 110.17 431.40 240.42
R
2
ML 35% 82% 61%
No. of observations 253 253 253
aSigniﬁcant at 1%-level.
bSigniﬁcant at 5%-level.
cSigniﬁcant at 10%-level.Table 8
Initial Returns and Price-Range-to-Oﬀer-Price Revision
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for some right-hand-side variables of the regressions in Panel B. An
IPO is constrained if its last grey market price before setting the oﬀer price is above the range maximum
and if the oﬀer price is equal to the range maximum. For IPOs that are unconstrained (ICON =0 )the
variables are: the actual percentage revision, PREV = 100(%)×(OFFER−RCENTER)/RCENTER;
the predicted price revision, PREV 0, estimated using the model in column (1) of Panel B of Table 7;
the surprise price revision, SURP = PREV − PREV 0.F or IPOs that are constrained (ICON =1 )
these are: PREV 0 (calculated as above); the latent price revision, PREV G, estimated using the model
in column (2) of Panel B of Table 7; the surprise price revision, SURPG = PREV G−PREV 0; the extent
of censoring, CEXTENT = PREV 0 −MAXREV, where MAXREV denotes the percentage diﬀerence
between the center and the upper bound of the range.
Panel B reports OLS, GLS, and instrumental variables (IV) estimates. The dependent variable is the
initial return between the oﬀer price and the closing price on the ﬁrst trading day. Column (1) reports
estimates for a set of control variables deﬁned in Panel B of Table 6, as well as an indicator variable ICON
that equals one for IPOs with constrained pricing. Columns (2) and (3) report estimates for the variables
that capture the “surprise” price revision. Columns (4)–(6) report estimates for the actual price revision,
PREV (for unconstrained IPOs) and the estimated latent price revision, PREV G (for constrained IPOs).
Column (5) reports GLS estimates which allow for diﬀerent disturbance variances across the two groups
of IPOs: those with unconstrained oﬀer prices (ICON =0 )and with constrained oﬀer prices (ICON = 1).
Column (6) reports instrumental variables estimates using the expected price revision PREV 0 and two
higher moment instruments for the variables PREV and PREV G.t -o rZ-statistics for robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 8, Panel A
79 Unconstrained IPOs (ICON =0 )
SURP PREV PREV0
Mean (%) -15.575 -6.523 9.052
Std.Dev. (%) 14.884 8.609 13.793
Median (%) -16.435 -5.000 10.330
Min (%) -46.630 -28.889 -20.746
Max (%) 19.159 9.091 40.322
174 Constrained IPOs (ICON =1 )
SURPG PREV G PREV 0 CEXTENT
Mean (%) 32.068 60.485 28.418 20.202
Std.Dev. (%) 51.916 60.938 23.237 23.272
Median (%) 15.624 37.151 22.345 14.563
Min (%) -37.371 5.980 -11.691 -22.802
Max (%) 305.680 359.597 120.423 113.280
53Table 8, Panel B
Dependent variable: INITIAL RETURN = 100(%) × (1stCLOSE − OFFER)/OFFER
OLS OLS OLS OLS GLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 43.327
b 0.519 12.681 19.770 13.720 16.437




b 1.517 0.931 -3.864
(6.98) (2.74) (2.55) (0.28) (0.19) (-0.42)
SURP ∗ (1 − ICON) (%):
coeﬀ. γU -0.076 -0.385
(-0.78) (-1.28)




PREV ∗ (1 − ICON) (%) -0.154 -0.013 -0.182
(-0.58) (-0.07) (-0.67)













(0.03) (1.85) (2.44) (0.55) (2.48)
Issue-speciﬁc variables:
UMSHARE -0.713 -0.939 -0.935 -0.154 -0.966
(-0.72) (-1.62) (-1.61) (-0.45) (-1.64)
FSOLD (%) -0.780 -0.263 -0.320 -0.361
c -0.256
(-1.45) (-0.70) (-0.86) (-1.70) (-0.70)
Log(SALES) -4.424
c -2.309 -1.962 0.407 -1.621
(-1.90) (-1.46) (-1.18) (0.53) (-0.96)
ASSETS -0.015 -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010
(-1.12) (-1.08) (-1.43) (-1.23) (-1.37)
Industry dummies:
IINTERNET -41.857
c -11.633 -13.083 16.410 -9.065
(-1.71) (-0.73) (-0.82) (1.43) (-0.53)
IHIGHTECH 2.466 0.362 -2.213 0.832 -2.877
(0.22) (0.05) (-0.32) (0.16) (-0.43)
IHIGHTECH × IINTERNET 18.987 -6.479 -4.039 -21.008
c -7.254
(0.66) (-0.35) (-0.22) (-1.72) (-0.37)
Secondary market index:
IXtW →tP (%) 1.905
a 0.411 0.428 0.420
c 0.223




tW →tP (%) 0.074 -0.024 -0.023 -0.034 -0.037
(0.48) (-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.57) (-0.45)
¯ IR
NQ
tW →tP (%) 0.118 0.049 0.047 -0.037 0.037
(1.25) (0.86) (0.82) (-0.93) (0.63)
¯ IR
NM
tW −2m (%) 0.276
b -0.053 -0.049 -0.014 -0.094
(2.42) (-0.57) (-0.55) (-0.29) (-0.96)
¯ IR
NQ
tW −2m (%) 0.185 -0.058 -0.054 0.087 -0.087




tW →tP -0.177 -1.503 -1.413 -0.367 -1.586




a -0.330 -0.261 -0.269 0.026
(-2.86) (-0.66) (-0.48) (-0.84) (0.04)




p: hypothesis INFOU (H0: γU =0 ,HA: γU > 0) 0.782 0.900
p: hypothesis INFOC (H0: γC =1 ,HA: γC > 1) 0.159 0.147
p: H0:c o e ﬀo fPREV ∗ (1 − ICON)=0 ,HA:c o e ﬀ> 0 0.719 0.528 0.505
p: H0:c o e ﬀo fPREV G ∗ ICON =1 ,HA:c o e ﬀ> 1 0.195 0.319 0.141
p: H0: δ =1 ,HA: δ  =1 0.682 0.913
p: zero coeﬀ. of issue-speciﬁc variables 0.066 0.040 0.065 0.251 0.075
p: zero coeﬀ. of industry dummies 0.118 0.301 0.243 0.3133 0.302
p: zero coeﬀ. of primary market indices 0.006 0.782 0.542 0.718 0.387
p: all coeﬀ. equal 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F/χ2 8.70 94.67 24.84 24.30 439.23 (χ2) 22.73
R2/R
2
ML 38% 74% 76% 76% 82% (R
2
ML) 75%
No. of observations 253 253 253 253 253 253
aSigniﬁcant at 1%-level.
bSigniﬁcant at 5%-level.
cSigniﬁcant at 10%-level. 
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